Itoarguments part 1

The kind of proof: (Ic) for the identity proofs, (Ix) for ixperiencit proofs, (B) for both.

As in any scientific theory there are many supporting arguments and reasons to support one theory over another or to disprove the alternates theories. Here is a list of some of supporting arguments. Together these arguments make a strong case for the identireplica theory of consciousness.

Argument for simplicity

The ixperiencit theory of consciousness is the simplest theory that fits the evidence. Ockhams razor: use the simplest explanation until we have reason to accept or believe in a more complex theory.

First, go with the simplest theory that can define, explain, and predict, all the aspects of the problem. Second, nature is not so complex to create the problems of complexity where it is not needed such as making every cidentireplica have a different unique consciousness.

Scientific argument

The ixperiencit theory of consciousness is the most scientific theory of consciousness. If there is no regularity there is diminished possibilities of understanding. Science can do the most with this theory. Repeatability, duplicateability, predictability, explainability, are the keys to science. This means that something has such and such an outcome over and over. If the starting conditions are the same and the conditions that effect it through time are the same we will have the same outcome. This is predictability. For example, when certain chemicals are mixed together in certain ways they will form other specific chemicals. This is the basis of chemistry. Physics predicts that when we have certain forces on certain objects they will behave is very specific predictable ways. The identireplica theory of consciousness ---- the science of superimmortality ties certain functions and structures of nervous systems to certain consciousnesses. In chemistry and physics the place, the time, and the matter that you use, are not the controlling factors in a reaction. It does not matter where or when you mix vinegar and baking soda, if the external conditions are the same, it will fizz and produce bubbles. It can be different vinegar and different baking soda. As the initial conditions and environment change the results will change as well. Such as how fast the reaction will occur depending on temperature and pressure. Duplicateability is what science is all about. The identireplica theory of consciousness is based on this as well. What makes a theory scientific? Its ability to predict and explain nature in the simplest way that covers all the variations, the ability of a theory to have duplicateable results, and theory that allows for the interchangeability of matter, energy, and space, in experiments and in technology. The science of superimmortality is rational, is logical and it fits together well without further undefined or poorly defined concepts.

Scientific Duplicateability argument

Duplicateability is the key to scientific understanding. With out duplicateability identical conditions cannot be created, nothing can be predicted. If an experiment can not be duplicated it is worthless because we can not ever predict this result again. Intermittent duplicateability means that there are more factors involved that we do not understand or To understand consciousness there has to be some types of duplicateability identical conditions producing identical results for experiments If the experiments do not have identical results them then all the factors are not taken into account what about quantum mechanics where the results are not duplicateable. Quantum mechanics is very predictive. The results of qm are very duplicateable within a probabilistic scheme. In this case we have predictive results within probabilistic conditions. Consciousness can also be probabilistic as well and predictive. For example 1 out of a ten cidentireplicas produced as close as possible to the original will have exactly the same consciousness for x amount of time 1 will have it for 1/10 x amount of time and the rest are close videntireplicas to the original. This is predictive and duplicateable. Like predicting the rolls of a dice you may not know exactly what you will roll but it will be a 1 to a 6 for one dice or 2 to 12 for two dice

Most predictive, explanative, and better theory argument

The ixperiencit theory of consciousness is the most predictive and explanatory of theories about consciousness and immortality. There exist huge continuums of potential physipaths. What awarepaths will these continuums of physipaths correspond to? This theory gives scientific answers to these types of questions. Continuums of awarepaths correspond to thus can be mapped to continuums of awarepaths. The soul theory will say that each individual physipath will correspond to a unique singular awarepath no matter how identical the functioning and structure or physipaths are to each other. This theory is a better theory than the soul theory because it is more predictive and explans more. It is optimistic. It allows us as individuals to understand the universe better. In superpaths it allows us to consciously exist produced by enhanced physapaths or enhaphysapaths.

This theory explains and predicts more than any other theory about where to find a particular consciousness. How it is produced. How to produce a particular consciousness. etc. Other theories do not even consider this because it is out of their hands if it is like most supernatural theories it is in god’s hands or into a non understandable reincarnation or resurrection realm.

If any theory of consciousness allows for each cidentireplica to have any awarepath, the theory will not be predictive. These other theories can not explain why each cidentireplica will not produce the same awarepath as its corresponding original did.

A different theory that does not believe that identical structure and functioning of matter produces identical consciousness will have to explain why each cidentireplica of the original is different from the original and from each other in respect to consciousness (and do it scientifically). In this circumstance you would have to make the assumption that structure and functioning does not produce consciousness. Then what does? The soul theory does not explain how consciousness is produced or even how the soul is produced. The soul theory does not predict where your consciousness can be found.

Physical continuity theory of personess: To be the same person you have to have to have physical continuity in space, time, and matter, and some specific core conscious continuity.

Mental continuity theory of personess: There is more mental continuity and less physical continuity, there has to be a carry over memories, emotions, personality, self identity, etc.

Soul theory: There are different versions but the core of yourself not necessary with memories or personality is carried over

Buddhist theory: Since you are always changing there is not really a specific you. You are not the same person as you were twenty years ago and you will not be the same person twenty years from now. Something that does not really exist cannot be destroyed.

Metaphysical doctrines

You are singular, that there can not be more than one of you at a time.
That your consciousness is private no one else can experience your consciousness.
You are unique, there will never be another you, your experiences will never happen again.

Extra substance theory: There is some extra substance that have properties different from matter that carries the person through space and time, that is more than just forms of dualism.

Computer functionalism: A consciousness can be produced and understood as a program run on a computer. The different inputs creates the different person.

Most technological useful argument

With this theory we can do all sorts of things with consciousness and be able to predict what consciousness that we are producing. This theory allows for superimmortality and shows how it can be achieved, if desired. The soul theory does not give us information of how to control the soul in any way. It does not say where the soul can be found. The afterlife theory gives us no information about the afterlife that we can use to the theory of reincarnation is another theory that gives us no idea of what is going on. The heaven concept leads to a very boring existence, it leaves out all the possible variations that you could explore.

The identireplica theory of consciousness is the simplest scientific theory. It makes simple predictions and continuums that predict where and when certain consciousness will be produced and where other will not. Possible through the principle of the continuum and mappings isomorphic structures and functioning that produce the same consciousness will be easier to predict. This theory gives technologists a way to actually create and manipulate consciousnesses. This theory gives the how to create immortality and survival of death. It tells how to create and study consciousnesses.

The Straight forward argument

It is the most straight forward theory. There are less hidden aspects Looked at in the right way it is the most obvious theory from the experimental evidence that we have. For the first possibility being correct is as follows. Since the structure and functioning of each original produce a specific consciousness, if the structure and functioning of the body and specifically the nervous system produces consciousness then identical structure and functioning will produce identical consciousness in every case where there is identical functioning. This premise is what science currently proposes and is the basic assumption of this book. If a certain structure and functioning produces a certain consciousness, it seems reasonable that when that structure and functioning is duplicated that certain consciousness is duplicated as well. Since we already know that a particular functioning and structure of the original will produce a specific consciousness and have no evidence that it produces any other consciousness

for the interchangeability of matter argument

Because at any physipoint there are many different paths of functioning that are possible for a body, one grouping of matter can be part of many different structures and functionings. This concept of the interchangeability of matter and energy to achieve the same function is a very basic concept in modern science. One or more atoms of a certain element is interchangeable with the same kind of atoms with the result that the structure and functioning of the system will remain the same.

Consciousness is you argument

Consciousness is you. If you are not conscious you have no body. But you can be conscious with out experiencing a body. Without consciousness there is no you. If you are not conscious you are not aware of being alive. You can have a body with out being conscious of it? If this is true what then is to say we do not have many bodies and are just not aware of them all?

Consciousness is you. You would not be aware of having or not having a body if you were not conscious. It would not matter to you what happened to your body if you were not consciousness of it. The immortality or survival of the consciousness is what is important for survival of death. Your body with out your consciousness is not you or you existing.

Thus the survival of your consciousness is what is necessary for immortality. Defining your consciousness is to define your Ixperiencit. A consciousness either has your ixperiencit or not. Why can’t there be a continuum from one possibility to the other where it can be any thing in between? Where you sort of experience it.

What is the proof that a person can be consciousness with out experiencing a body? It is the proof based on sensepaths. Or consciousness of a body comes through the senses. Which is the sensepath. The sense path can be modified in many different ways. The sensepath can be modified so that You can see without seeing yourself. You can hear with out hearing your body making noise. Your kinaestheic sense can be modified so you do not feel parts of your body or pain. Even though your brain can produce feelings of body parts with out the existence of these body parts. People loose their sense of taste and smell with age so this sense can also be removed or lost. We can imagine a sensepath that does not refer to a body. You see no body, hear no body feel no body smell no body.

Even the corporalists seems to have a minimum amount of consciousness for survival to exist.

Ixperiencit argument

If you experience it is a case of conscious survival for you. If the original experiences it, it is a case of survival for the original. Imagine the reverse case that if you experience a consciousness it is not a case of survival for you. What I know is that I am experiencing something while writing this book any definition of personal survival has to stem from this concept. We have a contradiction if I expereince a consciousness but this is not a case of existence or being for me because that is what we want

The concept of the ixperiencit is the “you” in your consciousness. The Ixperiencit is you. You can change many different aspects of a consciousness but if you experience it, it is you. If some one else experiences it, (and you don’t) it is not you. For a consciousness to be your consciousness it has to have you experience it. The argument goes if you do not experience the consciousness then it is not your consciousness. If you do experience the consciousness it is you. An awarepath that you experience is you and one that you do not experience is not you. You can take away your body and you can take away your consciousness but if you take away the fact that you experience it, it is not you. “I experience nothing” is a statement about you existing beyond your consciousness. You can take away memories, abilities, awareness of an external world, awareness of a body, and what do we have left? We can have left an internal world of experiences of the moment. Any awareness of the past is an awareness of the present. Your brain has the ability to generate a reality of its own because the nerves will stimulate themselves and some connections and pathways will become stronger and more frequently used and others will become less frequently used. It will not be based on external stimulation. It will be based on the preestablished structure of the brain. What would be the end result of a brain that has no external stimulation? It seems that the brain will function in any number of ways depending on the original structure and starting conditions. It seems that the behavior of the brain could be like a complex equation with different initial conditions some times making a random pattern of behavior, other times cyclic, still others with clear patterns of functioning.

The key part of consciousness that needs to exist for survival of death or immortality to be a reality or exist or be valid is “I experience it” where “it” is the experiences feelings, emotions, etc. that happen to a person over time. If some one else experiences it and you do not then, that consciousness or person is not you.

Can a null ixperiencit exist in a consciousness? What is a null ixperiencit? This is a consciousness that does not have the consciousness aspect of Ixperiencit but it has other aspects of consciousness? Such as memories. This is the feeling that something is happening to you. That there is you and then there is the rest of the world that is not you or does not appear to be you because you do not control it nor do you feel it is it just the distinction

The ixperiencit is produced in the cidentireplica if it exists in the original and most if not all videntireplicas of you. Even if the ixperiencit does not exist in the original it can exist in the videntireplicas of the original.

Argument

For immortality or survival of death for a person to exist the concept of the ixperiencit has to continue not the body nor a particular awarepath. So we do not have to duplicate the body or the consciousness we only have to duplicate the ixperiencit. This falls in line with the soul theory because not all memories are the same in a future life or is the body have to be the same. The converse of this is that a person can have the same body and consciousness but if the ixperiencit of a person is lost that person is gone from that consciousness and body or no longer alive. Even though the person is exactly the same externally.

The simplicity of the ixperiencit concept is we can apply if to an awarepath and a physipath to see if that different person is you or not. Either it has your ixperiencit or not. Either it has your ixperiencit part of the time or not. Either it has versions of your ixperiencit or not. Since a person can have many different physipath and awarepaths it is nice to say that there is one unique quality about a consciousness and that is you experience it. If you experience something after death this is consciousness after death which can be called survival after death. If a consciousness can pop up so to speak at any time in the future that you experience you have immortality.

If consciousness are continuums how then do we resolve the problem of the situation where the consciousness is between two or more different ixperiencits? When we are asking is it your ixperiencit or not. We know that possibly this ixperiencit is some ones complete ixperiencit. We can resolve this in a superpath of the originals awarepath where the superawarepath is aware of the partial awarepath as being a whole. The structure and functioning produces a perspective or way of looking at something this way of looking at something is you. The You produce the meaning or perspective of the experience. The you is the perspective or source of meaning.

The superpath can tie two or more very different ixperiencits into one ixperiencit of the original or of the other originals. In doing this

We have feeling and sight etc these could have existed independently and the perspective or meaning would have been different so the ixperiencit would have been different. We can imagine a continuation from sight to feeling as a continuum of change and at the middle point which ixperiencit is it? In the relative superawarepath that is us-- human, we tie the two perspectives together into one ixperiencit. As human we share feeling emotions etc. That can be identical but many other things are different. For instance we might see the color blue identically sometimes or always our perspective might always be the same or there might be reasons that we will see blue differently sometimes like when you are made or have an eye injury. A change could make two perspectives more alike or more different. It could change one aspect to be more alike and another to be different but over all there is no becoming more alike or less alike.

A continuation of someone's consciousness argument

If a person (not a baby) is made (and that person is conscious) it is a continuation of some ones consciousness. If a cidentireplica is made it is a continuation of someone’s consciousness if not the originals. If it is the continuation of some ones consciousness, other than the original’s this person will have memories and abilities without a previous life.

If a identireplica or cidentireplica is not or does not produce a continuation of your consciousness it is a continuation of someone else's consciousness. Either way we have the situation where an identireplica, cidentireplica or videntireplica has extended, duplicated or created the consciousness of some original. If it has extended the consciousness of some original, it is an example of survival of death being produced by a replica. If it has duplicated the identical consciousness of some original that exists presently it has shown that your consciousness can exist in more than one place at one time. If the identireplica created the consciousness of some original that has never existed before it will have created it at some point along it’s awarepath where there has not been any previous existence of consciousness. This original will have memories of a previous life that have never in fact been realized in reality. This is more than survival of death this is survival of a consciousness that is not connected to a past. The person truly believes that he has had a previous life. Just like you and I believe we have a past. The past does not impinge on the matter and energy a signature of its past, it creates types of structure and functioning. The creation of an identireplica, cidentireplica, or videntireplica is the survival of someone else's consciousness if it is not the consciousness of the original. This consciousness can be from some one dead, from some one alive but at a different stages in their life or some one that has never existed before.

There is another possibility that could occur. This is the creation of an identireplica, cidentireplica or videntireplica that has no consciousness. It will certainly behave like it is a consciousness person if it is replicating a conscious person exactly. But this is not a guaranteed proof that it is conscious. It will either continue to produce a body with out consciousness or will produce a developmental awarepath. A developmental awarepath will eventually produce an awarepath that either extends, duplicates or creates the life of some original. A developmental awarepath is one that starts with no consciousness and gradually produces an increasing complex consciousness. The production of a person from one cell into a conscious being is an example of a developmental awarepath. To begin with there is no consciousness produced by the cell, eventually when there are some neurons that start firing there is the rudimentary mentapath produced. Later there is the rudimentary awarepath produced. This replica will have all the right answers to all the knowledge questions about the original. It will say that it is conscious like the original does. A videntireplica of the original will or can have the right answers also to knowledge questions of past experiences and memories possibly better than the original has.

A continuation of someone's ixperiencit argument

If a full blown person is created he will either have an ixperiencit or not. If he has an ixperiencit it will be the ixperiencit of some other person or a brand new person that has never existed before. Why should he have a ixperiencit? It will be some ones ixperiencit that has existed or that is just now existing for this first time. Superimmortality predicts that ixperiencitness as well as consciousness, behavior, and the structure and functioning of matter are not discrete --- "either or" concepts but continuum like concepts. For example, your behavior can be very much like the behavior you produced at a previous time like when you play the same piece of music on a musical instrument. The same movements of your muscles are repeated to produce these sounds, but not exactly identical.

Multicid argument

The multiple cidentireplica argument --- multicid -- pigeon hole

If enough cidentireplicas are created eventually one will have the same consciousness as the original or one of the other cidentireplicas. This argument counters the idea that we can never have two identical consciousnesses and that consciousness are not unique to a particular body. Now we can look at the set of all possible originals do any of the cidentireplicas of the first original match the consciousness of the other original. For Each original we can make cidentireplicas of one will eventually match

If all the cidentireplicas have null consciousnesses, What would be the reason for this? Remember they act just like people. You can bring the concept of an idoriginal in her because the idea is that as the original has consciousness an idoriginal will be consciousness as well. Since we can imagine an infinite amount of cidentireplicas for each original and there are only a finite amount of types of functionings or consciousness possible eventually Assuming there are only a finite amount of consciousness that can apply to a particular cidentireplica eventually if there are enough cidentireplicas made equal to the amount of consciousness there will eventually be a duplicate of consciousness. If there are infinitely small change then there will eventually be one very close to the original. Assuming there are an infinite amount of consciousnesses we can link one consciousness to each cidentireplica we make for the first original. Assuming we find no match we can take the next original and make an infinite amount of copies as well since all the consciousness are recreated in the first set of cidentireplicas we will immediately have a copy and every one there after will have a copy of some consciousness.

If we make enough cidentireplicas there will eventually be a identical consciousness or approximate consciousness to the original or to another consciousness.

If we have the situation where the cidentireplica does not have the same consciousness as the original we have a consciousness that is the same as some original. It could be a consciousness that does not exist as an original. Then this cidentireplica becomes the original for future cidentireplicas.

We can speculate that every cidentireplica produces a unique awarepath. If the cidentireplica produces an awarepath within someone’s awarevenue we have immortality for this individual being a version of him. Remember that a person awarevenue is very large and may even contain an infinite amount of awarepaths. We can imagine an infinite amount of unique awarepaths being produced by the infinite amount of cidentireplicas remember that each one of these awarepaths could be effected by the cid paradox and the concept of limits we can make infinite long unique awarepaths by stringing together two different awaremoments like stringing 0’s and 1’s of course every one has more than two different awaremoments in their awarepath

Another point is that the awarepath that each cidentireplica produces can not produce any of a previous persons awaremoments because you will have immortality of that awaremoment for that previous person.

Statement of the experiment: Make a cidentireplica of an original if it has the same consciousness as the original stop. We have shown that at least one cidentireplica has the identical consciousness as the original with the same functioning. If not make another cidentireplica of the original if it has the consciousness of either the original or the first cidentireplica stop. If not make another cidentireplica compare its consciousness to the original and the other cidentireplicas. Continue to make cidentireplicas and compare the consciousness of each to the consciousness of all the other cidentireplicas. If we finally find a conscious match we have found a case of duplication of consciousness. If we apply this to any point in a person life that has died we can come up with an example of survival of death. What if you only get the consciousness or awarepaths of people that are alive? If the original is killed (by accident) you have the other that is the survival of your consciousness.

How does this apply to the Ixperiencit? If we make one Ixperiencit after another will we finally have the same ixperiencit

The key is that if we make the same physipath will it contain the same ixperiencit ? This theory says that it will. What about those that say that it contains the same consciousness but not the same ixperiencit. It can contain no ixperiencit but this would be like not having a consciousness if no one was there to experience it. If consciousness is dependent on some one to experience but yet is part of consciousness it seem that we can have zombies that are consciousness but unaware of being consciousness thus.

How then does the pigeon hole argument work for the ixperiencit concept? If you make a physipath it will have an awarepath or not it will act like it has one because

If we make a cidentireplica of an original that has a consciousness and an ixperiencit, it will either have a ixperiencit or not.

Multivid argument

We can also look for an approximation or videntireplicas eventually we will get either an identical consciousness or an approximate consciousness. If we make a videntireplica of a replica what will its consciousness be? We can continue to make videntireplicas that do not have to be identical to the original or previous made videntireplicas. The identireplica theory says that each videntireplica will produce the corresponding awarepath for its physipath. What predictive theory can predict what it will produce if not the corresponding awarepath for physipath. We have to have a theory that explains why it does not produce the simplest answer

A statement of the experiment: make a cidentireplica of a person if that cidentireplica produces a consciousness that is within the awarevenue of the original stop we have made a type of immortality of the original. If not make another one

Since we may not be able to make a cidentireplica of the original we might be able to make an approximation or videntireplica of the original. If we can make one we might be able to make many of them, If any of the videntireplicas make a consciousness of itself

Statement of argument: make a videntireplica of the original if the awarepath is identical to the original or with in the awarevenue of the original stop we have an example of continuation of consciousness or multiple consciousnesses, if not make another videntireplica if this videntireplica is with in the awarevenue of the original or previously made videntireplicas stop we have an example of continuation of consciousness or multiple consciousnesses continue this process as long as it takes

Multixperiencit argument

If enough cidentireplicas are created of an original either the original ixperiencit is reproduced or an ixperiencit of one of the other cidentireplica that is not like the original ixperiencit will be produced. What if there is no ixperiencit produced in each case?

The ixperiencit version of multicid argument

A functioning brain that is identical to your brain, if it does not produce your ixperiencit it will produce either a nulxperiencit or the uxperiencit. We have no reason to believe that it will produce the nulxperiencit so it will have to produce the uxperiencit. The uxperiencit means that it is the continuation of some ones else ixperiencit thus this other person has survival of death. The next identireplica made either has the first consciousness (ixperiencit), the second (ixperiencit) or a third new consciousness or ixperiencit that again is a continuation of some body else's ixperiencit. What makes this new consciousness a continuation of an earlier consciousness? Will this consciousness have memories? Does this consciousness think that he had a past? What if there is only the uxperiencit it? This new ixperiencit will start experiencing things for the first time. How would we know or how can knowledge exist that this is the first experience of this person? If the new ixperiencit is not experiencing things for the first time then he is an example of multi simultaneous you's or

All cases have to be very restrictive as to the consciousness produced. What evidence do we have for consciousness being very restrictive when we make an exact identireplica? Do all consciousness aspects like personality etc. presuppose a past?

This experiment is the same basic structure as the multicid and multivid argument. Make a person, if this person has the ixperiencit of the original stop we have a case of multiple yous' and if the original or If not make another person if this person does not have the consciousness of the original or any originals

What we prove is different people can have the same ixperiencit. An ixperiencit is tied to a structure and functioning of a brain. Not to a particular singular unique person. The ixperiencit is the key to survival of death or immortality If you do not experience the consciousness of this other person there is not survival of death for you in this other person or other consciousness and ixperiencit producing life form or machine. The concept of the ixperiencit allows us to strip consciousness to the bare minimum yet keep the key aspect of a person’s consciousness. You have to as some point along the awarepath experience it or this awarepath is not you. Awarepaths can have connections to a person with out having your ixperiencit. They can have memories that you have. They can think that they are you. They can actually have the experiences that you do. They can share many aspects of consciousness that you do but if you do not experience this other person it is not your consciousness.

Compare every one that exist or has existed through time even in the future, see if any of they have the same ixperiencit, if one or more person have the same ixperiencit we have our case. This experiment can not be carried out but either there has existed ixperiencits in other people or not. If there has been we have supporting evidence. If not we do not have a disproof maybe no one has functioning and structure close enough to produce the same ixperiencit.

If the ixperiencit is a more complex concept than either you have it or you don’t or each person has a unique separate one to there exists a continuum of aspects we have the case like the multicid argument where there will be a range of different ixperiencit for each person

It seems possible that within the same awarepath, physipath? there might be different ixperiencits at least different version of it like in intensity.

See also: