Itoarguments part 3

Awaretheory arguments superlist, Itoarguments part 1, Itoarguments part 2, Itoarguments part 3, Itoarguments part 4, Itoarguments part 5, Itoarguments part 6, Itoarguments part 7, Itoarguments part 8, Itoarguments part 9, Itoarguments part 10, Itoarguments part 11, Itoarguments part 12, Itoarguments part 13, Itoarguments part 14, Itoarguments part 15,

There is the view that there can be identical consciousnesses but there is some other aspect or aspects that when a cidentireplica is created there is not identity for survival purposes. What can this aspect be. For the finite limits arguments to work you need to have a limited amount of potential consciousness being produced by a brain of a certain size and or structure. And you need there to be no other conditions that need to be meet for cases of survival to exist. These other conditions are like a soul or other dualistic aspects

Finite limits arguments

There will be bounds or limits to what a physipath can produce in terms of awarepaths. There will be a limit to how many different ways a physipath can function given a specific structure and enviropath etc,. There will be a limit to how many different structures a limited size brain can produce. Limits on the brain complexity and size means limits on the complexity of the consciousnesses produced by it alone. Because of the limited size of the brain there will be a limited amount of different consciousness that it can produce in a limited amount of time. Limited number of different neuropaths and awarepaths. Because of the limited size of the brain there will be a limit to the complexity of consciousness that the it can produce. Limited size of neuropath creates a limited complexity of the neuropath and awarepath.

Because of the physical level of structure and functioning that consciousness is produced by, consciousness can not be infinitely divided into smaller and smaller differences. So there are only a limited amount of consciousness that can correspond to a brain or to the original.

If there is a limit to the amount of different consciousness that a brain (of a certain size or structure) can produce, eventually a cidentireplica will duplicate the consciousness of the original or one of the other cidentireplicas of the original.

The finite limits can be applied with other arguments.

Finite limits principle

There will be bounds or limits to what a physipath can produce in terms of awarepaths. When there are limits on the brain complexity and size there will be limits on the variation of consciousnesses that it can produce. If we add an infinite concept like infinite length of the awarepath we can have an infinite amount of infinite long awarepaths from a finite amount of cyclic conscious aspects.

From the scientific concept or principle of limited effect that a limited substance will have a limited effect on the rest of the universe.

Another principe is that limited knowledge will have a limited effect.

Counting argument

There is enough variation in just structure and functioning of the brain to correspond to the different consciousness that can exist for humans. We do not need to add variations caused by changes in space, matter, and time.

There is enough variety in the structure and functioning in the body to correspond to all the consciousnesses that the body can produce so we do not need differences in space, matter, or time to create more differences in consciousness.

The basis of this argument is that if there are n possibilities of unique (human) consciousnesses and there are nm possible different physical producers (human bodies) of this consciousness there will be an average nm-1 different physical producers that will produce the same consciousness. If m is large that means that there are many different physical ways to produce the same consciousness. We can also look at this counting argument with any number of different analogies. I will consider the analogy of bags of marbles. The marbles correspond to the possible bodies and the bags correspond to possible consciousnesses. If we have more marbles than bags then we will have more than one marble in each bag. If the potential variations that can occur to the bodies (marbles) is greater than the amount of potential variations in consciousnesses (bags) there will be bags that have more than one marble or more than one body that will produce that same consciousness.

There are many ways to putting a group of marbles into a group of bags but if there are more marbles than bags there will be some bags that have more than one marble in it. If there are a great deal more marbles than bags then there will be bags that have many marbles in them.

The continuum hypothesis (principle) applied to the pigeonhole principle The continuum hypnosis applied to the concept of marbles and bags will say that if there are more marbles than bags the excess marbles will not all be put into one bag. We already know that the marbles are spread out through differences in structure and functioning. This means that because we already know that there are differences (colors) in consciousness (bags) and differences (colors) in functioning and structure (marbles) you can group the functioning that have more in common in the same bag -- consciousness Whether we can infinitely divide matter or energy into smaller and smaller parts does not effect whether the continuums principle applies to the counting or pigeon hole as a proof of the identireplica theory.

The argument goes If there are more potential physipaths that produce awarepaths than awarepaths then some physipaths will produce the same awarepaths. The more identical physipaths are to each other the more identical the awarepaths that they produce will be to each other. Physicontinuums of closest packed potential physipaths can be constructed

Limit principle

As small as we wish to divide the difference of the functioning and structure there will come a point where a change in structure and functioning of the brain will not produce a change in the consciousness.

There is a change in structure and functioning of the brain of the original that is small enough that there is no change in consciousness.

There is many different changes in structure and functioning of the brain of the original that is small enough that there is no change in consciousness.

Principe of variation

We know that there are many different structures and functionings and many different consciousnesses or variations to consciousnesses that can and do exist.

Taking one condition at a time first we can consider if the matter makes a difference in the consciousness produced. We can consider a one to one replacement of atoms in the body how many different permutations do we have? An Avogadro number of atoms is approximately 6*10²³ atoms One gram of hydrogen has this amount of atoms in it. Twelve grams of carbon has this number of atoms in it. There are approximately 16 kilograms of carbon in an average 70 kilogram weighing man. Thus 16/12*1000* 6*1023 = almost 10²⁷ carbon atoms in the human body. A ruff under estimate of the amount of atoms in the universe is 10⁷⁷ of which more than one in ten thousand is a carbon atom or 10⁷³ carbon atoms in the universe.

Each carbon atom in the body can be replaced with another carbon atom in body or out side of the body from any place in the universe. If there are approximately 10²⁷ carbon atoms in the body and 10⁷³ carbon atoms in the universe each atom in the body can be replaced with any one of 10⁷³ atoms in the universe so we have 10⁷³ * 10²⁷ for one replacement or 10¹⁰⁰ possibilities for the replacement of just one carbon atom. If we replace two carbon atoms we have 10¹⁰⁰ * (10¹⁰⁰ -1) = 10²⁰⁰ approximately.

To find out how many permutations or way of placing the carbon atoms in the body we use the equation nPk = n*(n-1)*(n-2)* .... (n - k+2) * (n - k+1) where n is the total amount of carbon atoms in the universe and k is the number of carbon in the body this number is approximately 10⁷³ multiplied together 10²⁷ times or 10^{75000000000000000000000000000}. This is just the replacement of the carbon atoms there are many other elements in the body including oxygen, nitrogen, calcium etc. Hydrogen is the most abundant type of atom in the body and in the universe so it will have orders of magnitude more permutations than carbon.

The next possibility is space. We have at least three dimensions that are connected to the functioning of the body. If the difference in the placement of matter effects consciousness we can look at the situation How many body size places are there in the universe? And then we have to consider the change in that space for each atom, subatomic particle, and photon. We do not know how far across the universe is but we have an idea because the light traveling to us has been traveling for billions of years. The universe is maybe 40 billion light years across or 4 *10¹⁰ light years the volume is approximately (4*10¹⁰)³ or 10³¹ cubic light years. Each light year is 10*10¹² or 1013 km so a cubic light year is or about 10³⁹ cubic km. Then we have 10⁹ cubic meters per cubic km. An atom is about 10-10 m. So there are 10³⁰ atom size places in a cubic meter. 10³¹ * 10³⁹ * 10⁹ * 10³⁰ = 10¹⁰⁹

A rough estimate of the number of atom size volumes in the universe is 10¹⁰⁸. If the body is centered on that atom sized volume it can be rotated in three ways corresponding to the three dimensions. If we rotate the body enough to get an atom change in the exterior we have approximately 10¹⁰ different rotation in one dimension. Since there are three we have 10³⁰ possible unique ways to orient the body around one atom. If we combine this with the amount size spaces in the universe we have 10¹³⁹ possibilities. We now can choose any atom in the body for the permutation and get 10¹³⁹ to the 10²⁸ power or approximately 10^{1390000000000000000000000000000}

Time will add another dimension to the complexity the universe is 10 billion years old there are 365 days in the year 24 hours in a day 60 minutes in an hour 60 seconds this is approximately 10¹⁷ seconds. A second can be broken down into billionth of a second to explain the behavior of atoms so we have 10²⁵ at least. This does not include the future of the universe. Time may be infinitely long and can be broken down into infinitely short pieces. Combining the three variables we have: 10²⁵ *10^{1390000000000000000000000000000} * 10^{75000000000000000000000000000}.

Matter is more divisible than just atoms there are protons, neutrons, quarks, photons, neutrinos etc. Making the above number order of magnitudes larger. Our universe might be one of an infinite amount of universes thus there might be an infinite amount of matter in this multiverse. Making the above number infinite. Space and time may be infinitely large and long and infinitely divisible so rather than the above number we will have some real infinite number of possible variations.

Why can’t consciousness be infinite in amount, corresponding one to one with these differences in matter space and time? There might be an infinite amount of consciousnesses but the possible amount of structures and functionings of a consciousness producing system can more than correspond with this level on infinity.

One writer believes that conservatively there are at least 10¹⁰⁰ synaptic states of a normal human brain. The brain change synaptic states in milli seconds or thousands of a second. Not all synaptic states can lead directly to all other synaptic states. So we will estimate only one hundredth of a second for the time to change. So in one second for one brain there can be 10¹⁰⁰⁰⁰ different physisections. There are approximately 3x10⁹ seconds in a hundred year life time. This corresponds to 10^{10000000000000} or 10 with ten trillion zeros potential synaptic physipaths a person could correspond to in his life time. This certainly is enough to produce many different versions of consciousness.

10¹⁰⁰ * 3x10⁹ = 3*10¹⁰⁹ synaptic states in one person’s physipath but the potential physipaths are

(10100 ) exp109 ==10exp10 exp11

The amount of synaptic change in the brain can correspond to all the different consciousness that can occur to a person we do not need to add all the other ways the physipath can change.

The structure of the brain of a person changes over his life time. This corresponds to the environment and the natural development and aging of the brain. This can take a different path as well.

If we take the total amount of possible physipaths and divide it by the total amount of possible awarepaths that correspond to a particular person or body we get the p/a ratio. The p/a ratio tells us how precise a physipath has to be to produce a particular awarepath. It also approximates If the physipaths for a body over a life time is

Combining the three variables we have: 10²⁵ *10^{1390000000000000000000000000000} * 1075000000000000000000000000000. = 101390000000000000000000000000000 + 25 + 75000000000000000000000000000 but what we actually have is approximately 10exp10exp30 to the 10exp10exp25 power that answer to the 1025 power which equals approximately 10 exp10 exp80. The universe can not make all the possible combinations in sequence matter in one corner of the universe can not appear in another corner of the universe in a short period of time.

Principle of countability of limited physipaths and awarepaths

We can count, or give upper and lower limits to the number of different physipaths in a physicontinuum with limits on size and complexity and the corresponding awarepaths if and when we have enough knowledge.

The number of finite length physipaths produced by a limited size and complexity of physipaths is countable.

The number of finite length awarepaths produced by a limited size and complexity of physipaths is countable.

Pigeonhole argument

Pigeon hole principle if there are n possible consciousnesses and n +1 consciousness bodies one of the bodies will share the same consciousness. If there are more possible physical structures/functionings than there are possible consciousness some have to overlap so some functionings and structures will have the same consciousness. If there are more total physipaths than awarepaths there has to be some total physipaths that produce the same awarepath.

It can be applied to ixperiencits also if there are n possible ixperiencits and n +1 conscious bodies one of the bodies will share the same ixperiencit.

Idoriginals argument

The idoriginal argument is that there can be two identically functioning originals that were produced in the exactly same way at two different places and made of different matter? What will be their consciousness and what is the reason that they would have different consciousness? If we consider a different time the idoriginal could be made of the same matter and be in the same place. The only difference would then be the time so how could time be the factor in producing a different consciousness? You have to revert to either the hypothesis that time makes a difference in consciousness directly or that it does so indirectly such as by making experiences different but the condition is that the experiences are the same and the Qm effects are the same.

If an idoriginal existed it will have the same consciousness as the original. We can not say that because it was not naturally made it will have a different consciousness than the original. We can ask the question that If two different people come to have the identical functioning and structure of their bodies or even just their brains, for a period of time, what will be the consciousness produced during that period of time? Why would they not have identical consciousnesses? In this case they do not necessarily have to have had identical environments to get to this point. They do not have to be in the same time period, made of the same matter ,or be in the same place. Naturally made alleviates the problem of making a cidentireplica considering its complexity. Why would they not be consciously identical?

The idoriginal argument is that if naturally occurring idoriginals exist we can ask the question of what will be their consciousness we have to prove that there consciousness will be different. Any proof can not be based on any difference in the environment, functioning , or structure because there will be none by definition. The difference will have to be one the difference in matter and energy and placement in space and time.

The concept of identical originals and the idoriginal argument

It is possible that some where and some time in the universe there happens to be two healthy, normal people that just happen to have the exact same functioning bodies for a certain period of time. In this situation there will not be an original and a cidentireplica, there will be two originals that share identical physical functioning. In this case we call the originals idoriginals as long as these two people have the exact same functioning. The two letters “id” that are on front of the term originals is from the first two letters of the word identical. Idoriginals is a subset of the set of cidentireplicas. All idoriginals are necessarily cidentireplicas but not all cidentireplicas are necessarily idoriginals. This is because to be a cidentireplica is to be an exact functioning replica. But to be a cidentireplica does not mean you have to be an original.

Idoriginals are exact functioning replicas of each other. We would not argue that the two idoriginals were any less conscious than me or you or any other person. A person who was an idoriginal would not know that he was a idoriginal unless the other idoriginal knew it too. In fact we can not know for certain that either I or you are not idoriginals until we check out every possible place (and time) where an idoriginal could exist.

The idoriginals will have behaved like people and conscious people. If I were an idoriginal, I would not have to argue that I am conscious nor would I have to for the other idoriginal because there is no way of telling which idoriginal is which functionally or materially, if they were interchanged. It is obvious by the definition that we can not tell the difference between the two idoriginals functionally but since they are made of different matter why can’t we tell them apart materially? This is because materially they are the same. If so much as one atom was different they would not be cidentireplicas. As a result, any kind of material tag that is part of the body, that we can scientifically discern will void the experiment. Both have the same reason, and right to be conscious. So one of the idoriginals can’t say that he is the original so he is the one that gets the one and only unique consciousness (soul).

There is no unique original in this situation. There are two cidentireplicas and two conscious normal people. As a result conscious people can be cidentireplicas and cidentireplicas can be conscious people. Possibility two above, where the cidentireplica in not conscious, is not a possibility here because we know that both are conscious. The idoriginals would be interchangeable. During the period of time that the two idoriginals brains and bodies functioned identically will they have the same consciousness? This is a narrower case than that with cidentireplicas in general. Thus it would be easier to prove and would be a supporting example of the more general case with all cidentireplicas.

There should be no discernable difference between their consciousness and their behavior consequently no cid paradox and no difference in consciousness between them enough to produce any mental paradox. The cid paradox can not exist here because they do not have to continue to function exactly alike or behave exactly alike. We are only dealing with the situation of when they in fact do function identically. This eliminates possibility three and four. So there will not be enough difference between the idoriginals in their consciousnesses for the cid paradox to occur because the second that the cid paradox occurs they will not be cidentireplicas of each other nor idoriginals.

We are left with the conclusion that the idoriginals will have consciousness that are, at the least, very closely alike or functionally identically. If their consciousness are not identical, then why, scientifically, are they not exactly alike? I know of no scientifically valid reason that there consciousness should not be identical. It could be argued that the universe will or can not allow this situation to occur. Either that it is too precise an alignment to ever exist naturally or that there is a determined force behind this scenario not allowing this to happen, such as a god. If either one or both of these reasons are true, it still does not negate the fact that if it did occur we would have identical consciousnesses in two separate bodies. There are two differences between idoriginals placement of the idoriginals and the matter used in their makeup. If it is the placement that created a difference in consciousness then will switching the two produce the same consciousness?

The concept of gradual replacement or itointerchangeability

If another theory predicts results different than the identireplica theory when it comes to replacement experiments it will have to predict what will happen and explain why.

We can imagine the gradual replacement of neurons between an original and cidentireplicas. We can do this is a number of different ways through time, space, and using different matter. If the functioning and structure stays the same but the consciousness does not there has to be a point where the consciousness is different. If replacement produces a different consciousness we can re-replace

The concept of gradual replacement supplies more support for this for the first possibility. Imagine taking the brain of the cidentireplica and switching it with the brain of the original. Assuming that the cidentireplica is still a cidentireplica of the original i.e., that they are still functioning exactly. The popular view point, and our current scientific knowledge would say that the cidentireplica will have the consciousness of the original because it has the original’s brain and visa versa the cidentireplica has the brain of the original and thus its consciousness. Ideally it would not be hard to imagine this switch because every part is exactly the same in exactly the same place. Then we can take one neuron at a time and then switch them back. If the two brains do not have identical consciousnesses, when we switch each neuron, at what point do the two brains switch between the two different consciousnesses? Or do we have a gradual change in consciousness. If there is this gradual change does it cause a cid paradox or psychosis. Or will the two minds have such a similar functioning that they produce consciousnesses that smoothly grade into each other?

Consider the situation where the two consciousness are functionally identical (where no cid paradox exists) but is qualitatively different, like in the case where the original sees red, calls it red, the cidentireplica calls it red but in fact senses blue. When we start switching the neurons as in the situation above, what mentally happens? The cidentireplica goes from sensing blue to sensing red. The original goes from sensing red to sensing blue. They both still call it red. Will there be a consciousness paradox at some point when the two switching consciousnesses do not neatly fit together? Will there be a different sequence of conscious change, if there is a difference sequence in switching the neurons? Is there a sudden change in this blue/ red consciousness within the switch of one neuron? Is there a gradual switch in consciousness so that they might at one point experience purple? Is it only one neuron that causes this switch? If it is one neuron that is responsible for this conscious change, what happens when it is removed or dies?

What happens when we apply gradual switching, one atom at a time, between these two neurons that produce the change in consciousness? Will it turn out to be one atom that causes the difference? Again we can apply gradual replacement to the atoms switching the subatomic particles? Remember, there is no difference in the structure, functioning, relative placement or effect on the functioning of the rest of the brain from switching these neurons, atoms, or subatomic particles.

If there is a difference in consciousness in between the cidentireplica and the original at any time, we end up with the situation that certain neurons or atoms or subatomic particles will have a property of “blue” consciousness and other neurons will have the property that produces “red” consciousness. If we can tell blue consciousness atoms, neurons, or subatomic particles or any other physical feature from red consciousness atoms, neurons etc. We do not have a cidentireplica. To fix this you put red consciousness atoms in the cidentireplica in the same place as they are in the original where red consciousness atoms a However, if there is no way to scientifically tell red consciousness atoms etc from apart objectively If this is the case, it takes away our technological ability to predictably manipulate consciousness. No matter how technological advanced we became we could not make or repair a person by design and accurately predict the consciousness that he will have. We have no evidence that red consciousness atoms or neurons exist

It is another situation where if there is a difference in consciousness there will have to exist a theory that is much more complex. It has to be explained why one or more neurons, molecules, atoms, etc., that functions exactly the same as another, will cause a change in consciousness. Since there is no scientific way of telling the two pieces of matter apart there will be no difference to develop a scientific theory explaining why they produce different consciousnesses. For there to be a difference in consciousness there has to be a difference in functioning and its consequent effect on consciousness. But there is none.

There is also the experiment of switching of atoms or molecules or even identical neurons within the body or system itself. Imagine taking a carbon atom from one part of the brain and switching it with a carbon atom from another part of the brain. Will there be a change in consciousness if there is no change in functioning? If we take one atom and switch them and have no change in consciousness then why not every one as long as the functioning stays the same there should be no change in the consciousness produced.

The concept of gradual replacement (property of itointerchangeability) states that when one part of one conscious system (human body) can totally replace and duplicate the functioning of another part in another conscious system, as long as it functions identically, it will produce the same consciousness as the part that it is replacing. And the total system, with the replacement will have a consciousness identical to what the unaffected system (with out the replacement) would have had. This process can occur over and over in a gradual replacement of the entire system with different matter. A corollary of this is; when matter can be so constructed to replace and duplicate the functioning of a part of a conscious system, when this part is used and does function identically the total system will produce consciousness that is identical to what the original system would have had.

We know that when a large enough part of the brain is destroyed or malfunctions there is a loss in mental ability, the property of itointerchangeability states that if that functioning is restored exactly then the mentality is restored exactly. It does not matter how large a restoration is tackled if the functioning is restored exactly, consciousness will be identical. So if the whole brain or even body is restored to the original functioning the original consciousness will be produced.

Repeating proof

--- nature ( it etc,) produced it once it can do it again.

Things can be cyclic and can repeat.

If we repeat the functioning of the original or cidentireplica we will get the same consciousness as we did the first time around.

If we do not then we will have another consciousness different from the first but the behavior will be the same as the first time

If repeating producing the same consciousness this leads support that

Take the original and redo the same functioning by changing the brain back to where it was before.

For both the awarepath and physipath.

Why can’t there be a repeat of a particular consciousness or physical structure and functioning?

We know that the neurological functioning of an original produces a specific consciousness. This specific consciousness can be any consciousness or aspect or combination of consciousnesses including normal, multi personalities, psychotic, sleeping, dreaming, etc We do not have any proof that this particular neural functioning will or can produce any other consciousness than the one it actually does produce. When we look back at a particular person’s life or part of his life, we can say that: that particular physical structure and functioning produced that particular consciousness. If some one is to say that a physical structure functioning produces more than one consciousness as in a multi personality disorders this is not a disproof that unless because the multi personality is one consciousness because it is produced by one body. The multi personality is a consciousness with different aspects.

Restoration argument

Gradual restoration argument

If the brain is destroyed in any amount, if we restore the functioning to the way that it was before it was destroyed the original consciousness will be restored.

The gradual restoration argument is a number of experiments in a sequence. The first is taking a person that just died and return him to the functioning that he had before he died. Will he have the same consciousness? It depends on the functioning of the brain. Will he have the same soul. Or will the soul have already left the body never to return. Since this theory does not believe in souls the soul can never leave it was never there. Children have survived in cold water that were technically dead they were restored to life through warming and getting the heart to beat and the lungs to breath. The brain in this situation did not produce consciousness.

We can imagine a longer period after death of restoring the structure and functioning of the brain. The consciousness that is produced will depend on the degree of restoration that is accomplished. If part of the brain is not restored there will be this lacking consciousness. If in each case we restore the structure and functioning of the brain to a state before it died of an accident then that consciousness and the body will be restored this is a type of scientific immortality. People that believe in freezing bodies and brains believe in this the only problem is that so muck is lost in freezing if there is a restoration in the body and brain how close to the original will the restoration be.

We can extend the concept of restoration our to any length of time with complete replacement of all matter in its original placement. Then we can consider the replacement to exactly the same structure and functioning with different degrees of interchanging places of the original matter. Then comes the replacement of the matter with different matter. Some might say that not all these will produce the same consciousness the identireplica theory says that it will. If it does not, where is it that it is no longer the same consciousness and why? Then there is what consciousness is the restoration actually producing and why? We are also left with the situation that, that will be the only way to produce a certain consciousness, because if it does not work for the restoration of the restoration. If the restoration was the duplication of another consciousness other than the originals then it is a case of survival of that original.

A version of the inverse argument

Principle of Restoration

If part of the body was changed in such a way that ones consciousness was reduced or changed then if we restore the functioning and structure to the way it was originally we will regain the behavior the lost or changed consciousness. Physical restoration produces mental restoration. There are many changes and or degradations that can happen to a body so we can consider many experiments about degradations and changes, and then their restorations. We can imagine changes and or degradations that are so small that there is no change in the consciousness produced all the way to degradations so extreme where there is no longer any consciousness produced at all. Then restore the bodies’s functioning and structure and especially the nervous system’s and we restore the consciousness of that body. The difference in time, place, and the matter used will not effect the restoration unless it effects how closely we can restore the functioning and structure to the original state. If the original functioning and structure is reproduced then the original consciousness is reproduced.

We can imagine the extreme cases where total degradation of all consciousness happens in many different forms. One case is where the body is the same but there is brain death so no consciousness. Restore to the original state of functioning and structure we restore the consciousness. Now consider the case where part of the brain is missing or has been removed and the rest is not functioning in a way to produce any consciousness. If the missing part is replaced and the rest is restored again the original consciousness is restored. The next case is where the brain is gone. There is still the body but with out a brain there is no consciousness. Restore the brain to its original structure and functioning and we have restored the original consciousness. Now we can imagine the whole body being destroyed blown to bits for instance. If that body was restored to its original functioning and structure it again would have the consciousness of the original. There is several more steps that we can take in this concept the first is that if we can imagine one restored body of the original we can consider more than one and the question is what will be the consciousness of the two? They will be identical as long as they function identically.

Now imagine that a mistake is made in the restoration so the functioning and the structure is different that the originals but is still with in the bounds of the normal human. If the functioning and structure is different enough we now have a person with a different consciousness than the original. The larger the variation in functioning and structure from the original the larger the variation in consciousness there will be from the original. We can imagine all sorts of variations in the structure and functioning from that of the originals. Some of these variations will correspond to consciousness of people that have never existed before. Their memories will correspond to experiences that have never happened before. They will be a continuation of a non existent person.

The restoration argument

The restoration argument says that if we restore the body to where it was before it died we will restore the consciousness or ixperiencit. There is no problem with this if there is a totally materialistic system but if we allow mentality to be different from the materialist aspect then we not only have to restore the body but figure out how to find and put back the consciousness into the body. But if there is no interim place for the consciousness to go because it is dependent on the body we can not find this consciousness because it is nonexistent if there is no extra substance or thing there is no thing to loose and to figure out how to replace. The second problem with the restoration is that to restore the consciousness to a body we have to restore exactly. But because of the complexity of the body we can never do this. The question then is what happens when we restore the body differently than it was originally. The answer to this problem can be answered by asking what functioning do we restore if not the original functioning. What would the original be experiencing if he was functioning like the restored body. You get a videntireplica or a vitopath when you do not restore it exactly.

Every aspect of consciousness can be shared we can share memories personality traits etc, but the ixperiencit is a little different If you experience it and I don’t we can not share that I can experience you experiencing it however.

Approximate restoration argument

Identical restoration is not always the best restoration. Most approximate restorations are ok for external purposes. Internally many restorations are ok also. We do not need identical restoration for the self. Improved restoration is usually better.

Inverse argument

If we change the functioning and structure then inverse (reverse) the process this is inversing the functioning. A certain functioning will produce a certain consciousness. If we change the functioning so that it functions differently than this, it will produce a different consciousness as when drugs or alcohol effects the brain or the experiences created by the senses are different. The brain under these circumstances is producing a difference in consciousness. If we inverse the process that caused this change we arrive at the functioning and structure (matter energy space and time) that we had before this change and thus the same consciousness.

If the functioning and structure of the body was inversed to a point in the life of a person before the present, then proceeded to function the same as it did the first time it will reproduce the original consciousness at that period of the original life.

The inverse process can be looked at as if running a motion picture back words.

To counter people might say that this can not happen.

The inverse argument is like restoration to a previous point in some ones life

Nothing there/ or left argument

When we look at the brain of a person and then take away all the aspects of that brain that produce consciousness there is nothing left to specifically tie a particular mind to a body. Since there is nothing left it has to be one of the properties of matter that we took away. So it can be replaced by replacing the parts sort of like the restoration argument but in a philosophical way. It counters the anti replica argument.

Divergence and convergence of functioning argument

If the functioning of the brain diverges in functioning then converges back to the same functioning it will have the same consciousness. This happens on a cyclic fashion in the brain when we have the functioning during the day as certain types of activity reoccur and the functioning of the brain

Imagine taking one physipath and making it exactly like another physipath what will happen to the awarepath will it converge into the other persons?

If two different physipaths converge and then there after have identical essential physipaths the identireplica theory says that they will then have identical awarepaths. And identical ixperiencits

They can converge and diverge over and over again they can start by being very closely alike or very different.

The principle that our physipaths can diverge and be different than they in fact are or were is a basic Even if someone believes in preordination or destiny could have be different if enough conditions were different

If you did something other than you in fact did your physipath would be functioning differently than it would have. It would still be you . But you would be experiencing differences in consciousness that you other wise would have. This difference in functioning corresponds a difference in consciousness. If changes were made to this divergent physipath to make it exactly like the original physipath that it diverged from it then should have the consciousness of the original .

Divergence and convergence of structure argument

In a way this is like the restoration argument as you restore the structure and function of a brain to its original states the consciousness converges.

Assuming no convergence or divergence of awarepaths this means that when there are identical physipaths they will not produce the same awarepaths.

It does not seem correct that physipaths and awarepaths can diverge but can not converge. How is it that a physipath can diverge. We can diverge one physipath with a potential physipath. Though they may not exist in reality they could have or have the possibility of existing in the future. What is the proof that awarepaths can converge and diverge people have consciousness that are more alike and less alike and that change. For them not to converge or diverge they have to change on a level that is different for each person. When two people have the same sensepath they will can converge with their consciousnesses. But this does not mean that this will be always the case there it seems could be individuals that when given the same sensepath actually diverge just because of the way the brain is structured

Arguments from the original

These are arguments about how external change or variations effect the original and his consciousness.

If we take the original and recreate the functioning and structure that previously existed will we have the same consciousness? If it produced it in the original functioning it should repeat it every time the structure and functioning is repeated if it is not repeated then we have no way of understanding consciousness we are left with the conclusion that any functioning can produce any consciousness This would imply that there is no specific connection between a specific functioning in the original and a specific consciousness.

What ever change we make we can reverse it and get the same consciousness.

Arguments for

Repeatability argument like argument #12

1. If it happens once it could happen again. If a condition exists once it can happen again unless there is a specific reason that it can’t exist again

Principle of Constant conjunction argument

If there is a conjunction once there is the possibility of the same conjunction occurring again. Are a specific physipath and its awarepath in constant conjunction? This is also the mapping argument for physipaths and awarepaths, physapaths and awarepaths, neuropaths and awarepaths, awarepaths and ixperiencitness, awarepaths and ixpepaths, epipaths and physipaths, epipaths and physapaths, epipaths and neuropaths, epipaths and awarepaths, epipaths and ixpepaths, and epipaths and ixperiencitness.

Principle of causality.

If one thing causes another (as in the brain produces consciousness), when that first thing or condition exists again then there is the possibility that the second thing can exist again also.

Principle of specifitivity of cause

If the specific functioning and structure of the body is the cause of a specific consciousness then a same cause should produce the same result.

Duplicatability argument

If the result a specific functioning and structure of the body is a specific consciousness then if the relationship is scientific it needs to be duplicatable. Science is based on duplicatable results. For example, if we apply an electric current to a resistor we will know the flow of electricity will be changed in a specific predicable way. If we could not predict the behavior of electronic components from experiments with nearly identical components and then extrapolating we could not produce electronic devices that work. we would not

Is versus produces

The statement the body produces consciousness is a much more appropriate statement than the body or brain is consciousness. This is because the body can exist without producing consciousness. And it they were identical the body would have to be producing consciousness at all times. if they are identical

We can say "the brain is conscious" is like saying the brain is gray. It is not saying that the two are identical. In the sense of identity saying that the brain is identical to consciousness is not correct. If the motion within the brain is stopped there will be no consciousness produced.

When we say that the brain produces consciousness are we saying that there is something beyond the brain? When we say that the brain produces consciousness are we stating a version of dualism? No!, unless you call functioning something different than the brain.

We can say that consciousness is identical to the functioning of matter and energy within a certain structures. It is not tied to a place or time or specific matter. The same matter, space, and time can produce a different consciousness. Under the right circumstances the same matter can be part of producing any consciousness. A specific brain implying a specific structure at a specific time. But a specific brain does not correspond to only one consciousness over time because the brain is always changing

For the identireplica theory of consciousness “is” will work, and not need the depth of explanation that produces needs. If the statement is “the structure and functioning of matter and energy is consciousness rather than the “body or matter” is consciousness. This compared to the term “the structure and functioning of matter and energy” produces consciousness. Consciousness is then a property of matter and energy when it has certain structures and functions in certain ways or it behaves in the certain correct ways

If, strictly speaking, it is “body is consciousness”, then, when the body isn’t, the consciousness isn’t also. Where as if the body produces consciousness when there is another body with the correct characteristics it can produce consciousness.

The body produces heat it is not identical to the heat that it produces. “Is” can imply identity. The awarepath is not identical to the physipath but there will be identity between a particular physipath and the awarepath that corresponds to it rather than use the term produces we can use the term corresponds to.

Does the “is” versus “produces” discussion effect the identity theory? If one of the functioning body attributes is consciousness rather than produces consciousness, does this cause problems for the identity theory?

The proof for produces rather than is, is that the brain that is not functioning does not produce consciousness or is not conscious. Consciousness is a changing thing so is the brain that produces it. A frozen brain still “is” but the consciousness “is not” we do not have identity. The brain is not identical to consciousness. What about whole brain functioning identity to consciousness versus part brain functioning identity to a part of consciousness? Does part of a brain's functioning produce part of a consciousness? What consciousness does it produce?

The argument for the “body is consciousness” versus “the body produces consciousness”.

There are philosophical differences within the materialist theory of consciousness. There are some major differences between this theory and some materialist theories. One of these differences is the statement that the functioning of brain (body) produces consciousness (which is what this theory is based on) rather than the brain is consciousness. When we say that the functioning of the body produces consciousness we could mean that this functioning produces a mind substance or mental properties. I intend when I say “produces” only what we know is consciousness from self introspection and the predictions of this theory.

I will define the “body is consciousness” as the statement being that there is only one consciousness and that consciousness is tied to that one body and no other body than that body. When that body is dead, destroyed, gone,etc. then that consciousness is permanently gone as well. Some materialist theories of the mind seem to imply this. It is a carry over of the concept one body, one mind, at a one time and at one place -- a dualistic theory of consciousness (“body and mind” rather than “body is mind”). But if there is no mind (a materialist, reductionist, or behaviorist belief) there is only body then body is consciousness. When the unique body is gone so is the unique consciousness. This is a monistic theory of consciousness. Or a singular theory as in people have “one soul”, ”one body” or “one mind”.

When we talk about “body produces consciousness (or mind)” we have a pluralistic theory of consciousness. There are three aspects not one or two--- body, functioning and consciousness. So there is not just the body as in the simple materialist view nor is there just the body and mind as in the dualist view there is the body, functioning of that body, and the consciousness. Each of the three are objects in the sense that they can be studied scientifically. Why should we think that the “body produces consciousness” and not that “body is consciousness”? The body has to function to produce consciousness and it has to function in specific ways to produce consciousness. If a body is frozen there is no consciousness produced. When a person’s body is “brain dead” there is no consciousness. The body is still there but there is no consciousness. The body is not always conscious. What happens to the consciousness? When the body functions in certain ways it is conscious. When it changes or functions in other ways it is not conscious. When the body functions in various other ways between these extremes it produces variations of consciousness. The body has the ability to produce variations in consciousness as its functioning changes. A persons body is not necessarily bounded by one particular consciousness.

The body does not always produce consciousness. The body is not always consciousness. The first statement sounds better. That is because the second statement should read “The body is not always conscious” making mentality an attribute of the body. This is because the word conscious is an adjective modifying the noun body. Whereas the word consciousness is a noun. The word conscious is an attribute of the body like red is an attribute of a ball. Where as consciousness is a object apart from the body.

When the body functions correctly it is consciousness. When the body functions correctly it produces consciousness. Is it the body or is it the bodies functioning that produces consciousness? It appears that it is the bodies functioning that produces consciousness. An attribute of a thing is not that thing it is a quality of that thing. If conscious is a quality of a thing called body, another body could have the same quality called conscious. If a body has a very specific quality called john’s mentality or conscious, another body could have the same quality I.e., john specific conscious. In the same way that two different balls can have the attribute red. So one way we have a thing and the other an attribute. So is consciousness a thing or is it an attribute or aspect of the body. “Produces” implies more than an attribute. If consciousness is an attribute of the body then it appears to be tied to that thing and the fate of that thing. So when that thing no longer has integrity it no longer has that attribute. That attribute is unique to that object. This applied to the body would mean a unique conscious attribute to each body In the identity theory if consciousness is an attribute of a body it is not uniquely tied to that body

Is functioning a thing or an attribute of a thing the body? Is consciousness an attribute or a thing? It does not matter for either one. Can attributes be produced? -- with out the object? With out an object does it matter for the identity theory. No!

I believe that we can reduce the brain functioning to a predictable theory that can relate specific brain functioning to specific consciousnesses and visa versa. I also believe that the brain functioning can be represented mathematically as can consciousness. But it does not follow that we have one unique soul (consciousness) for each body. If we repeat the functioning in the body we repeat the consciousness. When we say “is” rather than produce we limit ourselves to limited type of understanding. The statement that the body produces consciousness gives us more information than the statement that the body is consciousness. We do not know how the body is consciousness but we can know how it produces consciousness. I believe that functioning implies production not identity. Consequently, we deal with identity of functioning and not identity of bodies. Identity of functioning not identity of body produces consciousness.

When we say that the bodies’s functioning produces consciousness we are not postulating a “mind substance” that the body produces only what we already experience as consciousness which include memories, feelings, emotions, etc. We do not say that the consciousness produces the body. Where as if it is strict identical materialism you could say consciousness is the body and the body is consciousness.

When we take “is” and replace it with “produces” we eliminate some of the problems materialist theory of the mind have. A modification of this then is “the behavior of the neurons “is” consciousness” falls into the same trap. The behavior of the neurons “produces” consciousness sounds better.

Consciousness has meaning separate from that of the body. The body has meaning separate from consciousness. Things that occur in consciousness do not have to relate to the body that produces it. It gives conscious beings the ability to predict things that have not happened. Yet which can be a real advantage. Can we have this advantage with out consciousness. Maybe consciousness pathways are simpler to create than the same unconsciousness predictive If emotions are knowledge how do you create this in a computer. Computers are not robust or redundant in their computing ability. Could redundancy be what creates consciousness? Could it be that neurons having different meanings at the same time or one meaning but it is a complex meaning be what causes

We have several levels of the question

Does the body produce consciousness or the body is the consciousness.

Does the nervous system produce consciousness or the nervous system is consciousness.

The nervous system through its functioning is consciousness or is it the nervous system through its functioning produces consciousness

Consciousness can be scientifically reduced to the functioning of the nervous system.

A scientifically theory of consciousness can be developed based on the functioning of the nervous system.

Consciousness is not really identical to a body. Your consciousness is not really identical to a body in the sense that it is tied to only one body at a time.

Produces implies that there is actually something that exists apart from the body.

Reductionist say that it is the body that is the consciousness. A functionalist says that it is the functioning or behavior of the body that is the consciousness. This theory says that the functioning of the body produces knowledge. One aspect of knowledge is awareness and consciousness. On a very simple knowledge level the neurons say’s I am stimulated I am stimulating you. The act of change is an act of knowledge. Through the act of changing and stimulating we are communicating that change

Communicating change is knowledge getting the system to change in the desired way. The desired way it has no conception of the desired way

The point is whether it is produces, is, reduces to, functioning is, a functioning attribute or a thing this theory defines what happens when certain conditions occur to the body and to consciousness and to functioning.

Produces can be the functional reducer that reduction can use to tie the scientific theory about consciousness to a scientific theory about the functioning body. The Term “Produces” and this theory allows aspects of dualism to inter into this

A cid paradox is where the consciousness of the person does not correspond to the behavior of that person and that person is aware of this problem and appears to be a paradox.

Relativity argument

Because of the physics principles based on the theory of relativity we can change the time that the original was or is in, the speed that it is functioning in, but yet the consciousness will stay the same for that consciousness. In other words to the awarepath it will also seem to be the same amount of time passing.

Regular change argument

If a physical change in space, time, matter, etc. can change the consciousness produced, a scientific theory can be generated to predict this change in consciousness. It makes for a more complicated theory but it still is scientific and predictive and still is with in the realm of the identireplica theory of consciousness. This does not have to be a linear system. It can be a non linear system. It is more difficult for predictive purposes. But being predictive or not does not means that when the right situations arise there will be either the original consciousness or point on the original awarepath or a version of the awarepath produced.

Transformation argument

It is a possibility that consciousness is more complex than the simple identity theory. that transformations equations can be generated to predict what effects change in space time and matter will have on consciousness. Transformations equations by using proper transformations we can still produce an identical consciousness we then have the transformation theory of consciousness.

We still have created identical consciousness but it is more difficult and more complicated.

Against the argument that “We can never make a cidentireplica or videntireplica of any original.

We do not know what can be done with enough science and technology. For this theory to be correct we never have to make an identireplica or cidentireplica. To make a person we do not really need a perfect conscious or body match.

This does not counter the fact that if we did what would be the result? Or the question what is the consciousness of a cidentireplica or identireplica or videntireplica. The universe made the original it might make it again by chance second this may not be possible but there is a greater chance the more originals are that a identireplica will be created.

Whether we can or not does not means that it can not be made second whether it is ever made or not does not distract from the fact that if we did we would have certain. An example might be we might never go to mars but if we did mars gravity would effect the people that go there and the force of gravity will be less there will be less than on earth. Whether we go there or not there will still be facts about the situation that are valid.

Ito/geometry An analogy to geometry argument

We do not have to have the ability to create perfect conditions to consider perfect conditions. Perfect conditions are useful in all sorts of mathematics where in reality they may not exist or can not be created by man or any consciousness being even a god. For instance a god that can do any thing including making something he can not do. Making a rock so heavy that god can not left it.

The argument against this theory, that I most often hear, is that we can not produce an identically functioning body or cidentireplica of an original so it is not worth discussing or even considering the corresponding mentality of this theoretically constructed being. Just because we can not make something does not mean we can not discuss and study it mathematically and scientifically. Geometry is a case in point. The concepts of a point, line, plane, and parallel lines are the corner stones of geometry. This mathematics of space and form deals with points that have no dimensions, lines that have no width, planes that have no depth, infinitely long parallel lines, perfect triangles, circles, squares, etc. all of which we can not produce. This is because every point that we produce has a size, every line has a width, and parallel lines are not perfectly straight or parallel. Maybe these constructs do not or can not even exist in this universe or any other possible universe except as mental constructs in our minds. We can imagine them, and as a result we have produced useful areas of knowledge about them even if they do not, or can not exist. We have dealt with these ideal geometrical concepts, when they were in reality not ideal, and created even more knowledge that is and has been very useful to humanity.

The parallel postulate, or its equivalent in geometry is the foundation for Euclidian geometry. Two infinitely long parallel lines can never be produced or observed completely even if they did exist in reality. Yet different types of geometry are based on the idealized behavior of these infinitely long parallel lines. In the same way an understanding of consciousness is based on the concept of identical functioning bodies. If we are creative enough in our thinking we can see how cidentireplicas and originals can correspond to parallel lines. Our thinking about parallel lines have produced many new fields of mathematics such as Riemann and Lobachevskian geometries. These new fields have useful applications in the sciences. Riemann geometry being the basis for Einstein’s relativity theory’s explanation of gravity and the shape of the universe. Lobachevskian geometry has been used in explaining certain aspects of cosmology.

In creating any science we have to have a starting place. The identity theory ties together the science of consciousness with mathematics. It gives us a way to look at and understand consciousness mathematically. In the same way that geometry and other areas of mathematics have taken ideal concepts and built very useful systems of scientific knowledge so will this theory build itself into an empirically based mathematical science dealing with consciousness.

We can not make infinities and infinities of infinities each infinitely larger than the next but we can talk about them and their properties we can not make points with out dimensions or lines with out width or planes with out height but we can consider discuss them and determine the properties Dinosaurs have existed like an original but can they exist again. So we can do the same with cidentireplicas

We can always do what in done with limits in mathematics that is make the cidentireplica closer and closer to the functioning of the original as close as desired and see what happens to the consciousness that is produced(limit proof)

When we do the limit experiment we can see if a cidentireplica is uniformly convergent to a particular consciousness or awarepath of the original or if there never is a point where closer than that point there is uniform convergence. Uniform convergence is where every change that makes the videntireplica’s physipath more like the original’s physipath will make the awarepath of videntireplica more like the awarepath of the original.

Perfection argument

Some might say that we have to have absolute perfection in the identireplica to have identity in consciousness. Since this is impossible there can not be an identical identireplica consequently this person does not have the consciousness of the original.

We do not need perfection in replication structure and functioning to create a persons consciousness. We do not need the same matter, in the same place, or time.

There are many slight variations in the structure and functioning (physipath) that will still produce the consciousness of the original (awarepath).

There are many different awarepath that correspond to physipaths that have your ixperiencit in it.

Personality identity argument

The personal identity argument is that only one person can be you so that there can not be two of you at the same time. So there can not be any over lap in the existence of a identical replica with the original for survival of death to exist. It is supposed to be self evident that some one else can not be you. You don’t need to be the closest continuer to survive death because you are defined as your consciousness your consciousness is produced by functioning and structure.

Personal physical identity is not necessary for survival of death or immortality. Identity of functioning and structure is what is necessary.

A proof that it is the functioning is necessary for consciousness if the brain is frozen and there is no functioning there is no consciousness produced. When the body is dead there is still functioning is the sense that the atoms are moving

Brain scans tell us that when the brain functions differently it produces different consciousness. When different part of the brain is functioning in different ways patterns the person is think or experiencing different things. The "I" disappears as the consciousness goes into deep sleep so as consciousness disappears so does the "I" concept.