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Artificial experience argument

From Aware Theory
Revision as of 07:37, 24 March 2016 by Mark (talk | contribs)

It is often said that a cidentireplica of an original will not have the same life experiences that the original has so he can not have the same consciousness and ixperiencitness as the original has. An original is usually going to be made of different matter in a different place and time as the as an idoriginal or cidentireplica. The science of superimmortality predicts that idoriginal and cidentireplicas will produce the same consciousness and ixperiencitness as does the original. An idoriginal by definition has exactly the same externapath, thus exactly the same experiences, that the original has. On the other extreme of the experiencepath continuum a cidentireplica can come into existence at this moment without ever having any experiences at all. Consequently, the cidentireplica has had none of the experiences that the original has, is, or will have had. By definition of cidentireplica, from its creation it will have the exact same structure and functioning or physapath as does the original starting at that point physapoint in the life of the original. The cidentireplica no matter how it is made will have the same physapath as the original thus it will have the same behaviorpath as the original.

An "artificial experience" is an experience produced not directly by reality but by the artificial manipulation of the sensepath by a sensepaducer (sensepath producer). An original could have part to all of its experiences produced by a sensepaducer. An idoriginal could also have part to all of it experiences produced exactly the same way by a sensepaducer. If an idoriginal experiences were all produced by reality but the original experiences were produced artificially by a sensepaducer would they both have the same consciousness and ixperiencitness?

The Artificial experience argument is a continuum of experiments argument where if on the one extreme there is identity of some property and the experiment can be changed in very small physical amounts to the opposite extreme for this physical property. If there is change, then how much change is there, and then where, how, and why does this change occur? This continuum set of experiments goes from the extreme of having all the experiences naturally produced to all of the experiences being artificially produced. This is a experimental study in the changes in external physical environmental conditions. The controlled variable in the experiment is how much of the sensepath is reality produced versus how much of the sensepath is artificially produced, otherwise the sensepaths applied to the cidentireplicas are identical. The conditions is that at every point in each different expepath the physapaths are all the same. The results are how the consciousness and ixperiencitness change. Because they have the same physapath they will have the same behaviorpaths. The consciousness will have to be within limited bounds or there will be produced cid paradoxes. cidentireplica paradox



The point of the Artificial experience argument is for either supplying supporting evidence or proof that there are many different productionpaths for a cidentireplica that will produce a cidentireplica that has the same consciousness and ixperiencitness as does the original have.