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Identification argument for consciousness

From Aware Theory
Identification argument for ixperiencitness
If it is proposed that each person has his own unique ixperiencitness then the result is there will be no way to distinguish between the different ixperiencitnesses. If there is no way to distinguish between ixperiencitnesses then any science that deals with ixperiencitness will be extremely restricted in many different way. Imagine if microbiology could not distinguish between the different types of bacteria. An original is a different person from each cidentireplica of it. But there is another step that is supposed from the fact of being a different person, that is a cidentireplica will not experience the consciousness that the other cidentireplicas and their original has, even though they all have the same identical physapaths. There is the assumption of uniqueness of consciousnesses because they are produced in different places with different experiencers of the consciousnesses. Why can the consciousnesses produced by different bodies not be the same? There seems to be this assumption that consciousness produced by different bodies must be different. This implies that each different cidentireplica of one original will each have a different ixperiencitness.


Identification argument for consciousness
If it is proposed that each person has his own unique consciousness then the result is there will be no way to distinguish between the different consciousnesses. If there is no way to distinguish between consciousnesses then any science that deals with consciousness will be extremely restricted in many different ways. Imagine if farmers could not distinguish between different types of seeds. To distinguish between different things we need variations that we can see, sense in other ways, or other wise test for. Cidentireplicas from one original have one physapath but various physipaths. If the self is singular and unique as most people seem to think then either or both of all of the cidentireplicas of one original will have different consciousness and, or ixperiencitnesses. It might be conceded that they have the same consciousness but not the same ixperiencitness.This makes it possible to map identical physapaths in different bodies to one awarepath.


Scientific arguments, Most scientific theory argument