N-cidentireplica experiments

N-cidentireplica experiments setup for the two cidentireplica case:

We start with two cidentireplicas of each other they can be human or some other conscious producing system. But for this particular experiment they will be human. We are not considering either one to be the original even though both could be considered the original. The original designation make no difference in this experiment.

All conditions are kept the same so that they continue to be cidentireplicas of each other over the time of the experiment. If there are QM deviations in structure and functioning they are knowing corrected by an external source.

As a human there is food, water, and air, that is used continuously and expelled over time. This reccycled matter is kept and used to supply the other cidentireplica for his necessary nutrients and visa versa so that eventually all the matter that was in cidentireplica #1 is now in cidentireplica #2 and visa versa. They both had the same consciousness from the beginning of the experiment. What we want to know is what is the ixperiencitness of the two. Are they identical or are they different?

Cidentireplica #1 is made of cidentireplicas #2 matter and visa versa. If matter is important then cidentireplica #1 now has cidentireplica #2 ixperiencitness and visa versa. If continuity and continuousness of cosciousness is important then they both retain their original ixperiencitness.

The most logical and reasonable explanation is that they started with the same consciousness and ixperiencitness and at the end of the experiment they still had the same consciousness and ixperiencitness. If this is the case then itomultiplicity is true at this level.

If itomultiplicity is not true and we accept the the singularity of ixperiencitness, then we have to make the choice of did the ixperiencitness switch or not?

The first assumption is that there is a difference in the ixperiencitness to begin with, even though the consciousness is the same. If there is not a difference in the ixperiencitness then itomultiplicity is true in this case. Which is the case that identical ixperiencitness comes with identical consciousness. This also makes the assumption that there really is something such as the ixperiencitness that is different and independent from consciousness.

The second assumption is that if your reject itomultiplicity as a solution you are left with five possibilities.

1. Both have an ixperiencitness and they have not switched.

2. Both have an ixperiencitness and they have switched.

3. Their ixperiencitness have both disappeared.

4. One ixperiencitness has disappeared and the other has not.

5. One or the other or both cidentireplicas have new and different ixperiencitnesses

Possibility 5. This possibility creates all sort of problems of how the ixperiencitnesses disappeared or were destroyed and where the new ones came form? A second problem is: Where in the process were they destroyed and where did the new ones appear? Why these particular ixperiencitnesses and not different ones?

Possibility 4. This possibility does not seem reasonable because we have no reason to prefer one cidentireplica over the other.

Possibility 3. With multicid experiments and multivid experiments showing that they are in fact conscious because they say that they are conscious and say that they are experiencing the consciousness, it will be hard to prove that the consciousness is not being experienced.

Possibility 2. If possibility #2 is true then ixperiencitness is based on the specific matter not continuity of consciousness. This possibility has many problems that have to be understood and solved before it is very viable. For instance, at some point there has to be the switch in the ixperiencitness. Is it at the fifty percent point where there is now fifty percent of the matter that has been switched? Is it important where the matter comes from and where it goes in the body? For instance, the matter from the brain of one cidentireplica to the foot of the other? What happens when we have more than two cidentireplicas in the switching process? There does not have to ever be a fifty percent switch? Each cidentireplica can end up with a small portion of each of the other cidentireplicas original matter.

One good reason that the specific matter is not the important factor in producing consciousness and ixperiencitness is that most of the matter in the body is being replaced gradually all the time anyway, so that you are not made of the same matter that you were ten years ago but yet you still have the same ixperiencitness.

Possibility 1. If possibility #1 is true then ixperiencitness is based on the continuity of consciousness not the specific matter. The first problem with continuity of consciousness is what does it mean? Does it mean continuousness of consciousness, or sameness of consciousness or both? Consciousness is not continuous because of sleep, comas, anesthesia, etc. Human consciousness is not the same from time to time either. It could also be possible that ixperiencitness is based on continuity of ixperiencitness. But this is redundant; the continuousness or sameness of ixperiencitness is based on the continuousness or sameness of the ixperiencitness. The concept of continuity applied to this problem makes the solution ambiguous.

At best continuity of consciousness is a partial or semicontinuous consciousness and has some conscious aspects that are like previous parts of your consciousness.

Philosophers in order to prop up continuity of consciousness have added continuity of matter based on the concept of the assimilation of matter. There is no proof of there being assimilation of matter other than to putting the matter in the correct locations in the body which is a chemical and mechanical process.

Ixpesingularity and consingularity are two types of philosingularity

Ixpesingularity is the concept that means that only one itobody can exist at a time with a specific ixperiencitness. Two identical consciousnesses will never have the same ixperiencitness

Consingularity is the concept that means there can never be two identical consciousnesses.