View source for Fusion of bodies arguments

This topic deals with the rational experiments concerning the fusion and fission of bodies, consciousness, and ixperiencitness. Usually these topics are found in writings and discussions concerning personal identity.

The fusion of bodies is the joining of body parts of one or more different bodies. The fission of bodies is the taking apart of one or more bodies. the purpose of these [[rational experiments]] is not for some perverse pleasure of seeing some people or animals suffer but to consider the continuity of the consciousness and ixperiencitness. 


Experiment #1

Imagine there are two different bodies one called the [[original]] and the other called its [[cidentireplica]]. By definition the cidentireplica has the exact same structure and functioning that the original has and is doing the exact same body functioning at exactly the same time as the original. The [[ixperiencit theory of consciousness]] predicts that they both are producing identical consciousnesses and ixperiencitnesses at the same time. Most theories of personal identity predict that they are not personally identical; in other words they are not the same person. This is true, they are not the same person. But not being the same person can not be used accurately to predict anything about the consciousness and [[ixperiencitness]] that they are producing. Imagine the situation where personal identity theory predicts that the original and cidentireplica in this case do not and can not have the same ixperiencitness, what will happen if each one is  divided down the middle and recombined with the half from the other person into two exactly functioning new bodies. How can we predict what happens to the ixperiencitnesses produced by the resulting bodies? There are no reasonable answers starting from this perspective of their no identical ixperiencitnesses. The possibilities are, that there is no resulting ixperiencitness in either one. The second possibility is that each new body produces the ixperiencitness of only one of the original bodies, but none from the other original body. and the other has the other body's ixperiencitness The third possibility is that there is a combination of the original ixperiencitnesses into new different ixperiencitnesses different from the previous ones and still different from each other. The fourth possibility is that they both have the same resulting ixperiencitnesses. But his would imply that they could have had the same ixperiencitness in the first place. If any of these results are true then science will likely be impossible because there is very little if any explainability and predictability given the original assumption that they can not have the same ixperiencitness. 

For example, if the first case in true the resulting bodies do not produce any ixperiencitness. The physical evidence would seem to show other wise because they will have the same behavior at the same time and say that they are consciousness. this would also mean that there can be conscious beings that do not experience anything which is a reductio ad absurdum --- an argument leading to an absurdity. 

In the second case there is no way to tell which ixperiencitness goes to which body and why because there is equal reason for the different ixperiencitness to go to each body.

In the third case there is a new and different ixperiencitness for each new body produced by the combination of the two. Is there are way to predict what the resulting ixperiencitness will be from the original ixperiencitnesses?

The fourth case contradicts the original contention that two different bodies can not have the same ixperiencitness. If the resulting bodies can have the same ixperiencitness then the original bodies could have the same ixperiencitness as well.

The process does of fission and fusion of bodies and body parts does not have to stop with one iteration, or just two bodies the ixperiencit theory predicts that identical structure and functioning of matter produces the same consciousness and ixperiencitness. 

Now consider the predictiveness and simplicity of the the [[ixperiencit theory of consciousness]] predictions that they have the same ixperiencitness to begin with and the same ixperiencitness after the fission and fusion of the bodies

[[Principle of fission and fusion of different bodies]]: After any number of fission and fusions of any number of different bodies or parts of bodies of different bodies if identical structure and functioning is produced there will be identical consciousness and ixperiencitness produced as well

[[Corollary 1 Fission and fusion of different bodies]] If during any sequence of fission and fusions of different bodies there are resultant in between bodies that are not identical to the original set of identical structure and functioning bodies but none the less the ending resulting bodies has the same structure and functioning as the original set they will still produce the same ixperiencitness and consciousness.

[[Corollary 2 Fission and fusion of different bodies]] The resulting structure and functioning of a body or bodies after any number of fissions and fusions do not have to be identical to the original set of bodies to produce the same consciousness and ixperiencitness. This means several things; First, there are changes in the structure and functioning so small or un-effecting that they alone do not change the consciousness and ixperiencitness produced by the resulting bodies. Second, there can be parts of the body that do not effect the consciousness and ixperiencitness produced by the resultant bodies thus they can be changed without effecting the consciousness and ixperiencitness produced by them. Third it is possible that certain different sub structures in the body or brain can be different but still serve the same functioning so that it still produces the same consciousness and ixperiencitness.

[[Corollary 3 Fission and fusion of different bodies]] Larger changes in the structure and functioning in the resulting bodies after a number of fissions and fusions can occur where identical consciousness is no longer produced but identical ixperiencitness is.