Replacement of matter experiments
Replacement of matter experiments can be applied to every kind of identireplica to see if the same consciousness and ixperiencitness is continued or not. This leads to the principles dealing with consequences and predictions of these experiments for each type of itoidentireplica.
The summation of Replacement of matter experiments form an expecontinuum.
The outline of the extent of the experiments.
The smallest amount of replacement is a subatomic particle like a photon. This happens naturally all the time as the body gives of black body radiation and is absorbing light. This does not appear to effect the ixperiencitness of the itobody.
The next level is the replacement of atoms and molecules. The human body is constantly replacing atoms in the body through food ingestion and excretion. This does not appear to effect the ixperiencitness of the original either.
Replacement of body parts produces expeboundaries and expeanomalies in relation to the production of the ixperiencitness. Replacing a body part like an arm with an identically structured and functioning arm, asuming it is not such a tramatic event that it actually produces a change in the ixperiencitness itself, does not change the ixperiencitness. If the person was not aware of the arm replacement there would be no change in the ixperiencitness due to the replacement. There are body part replacement operations done many times all over the world. If we believed that we lost our ixperiencitness (soul or self) when these operaton occurred, we likely would not perform them. These operations do not even use identical body parts.
There is one type of body part replacement that is not exactly understood. This is brain removal and replacement. Most thinkers believe that if we replace your brain in your body with Georges brain, we will have your body with George's brain in it. So we are going to have the personality and memories of George acting through your body. It seems most rational to say that we are producing the ixperiencitness of George not your ixperiencitness even though this person looks just like you. What has happened in this case is that the structure and functioning of the brain is very different now. This person will say that he is George even though when he looks in the mirror he sees you. This shift might be very traumatic for George to the point that his consciousness changes enough so that he no longer has the same ixperiencitness. But this new ixperiencitness will not be your ixperiencitness unless by some external brain changing source it restores the structure and functioning of the brain to a version of your brain.
So what if we replace the brain with an exactly identical brain will we have the original's ixperiencitness produced by the new brain? Since this new brain being identical, will be functioning identically, we will have the same behavior, personality, memories, etc., produced by this new brain, consequently, no one will be able to tell the difference. Will the individual know that there is a difference? Obviously he will if he is in pain due to the operation or sees a wound. But imagine the switch being produced in such a way that there is not wound or pain or change in the functioning of the brain. The person would not know that something has happened. Asked if he felt anything different he would say no.
The next stage is replacement of the whole body of the original with an identical body or cidentireplica of the original. If replacement of the brain produced the same ixperiencitness then replaement of the whole body will produce the same ixperiencitness as well.
If the replacement cidentireplica produces the same ixperiencitness after the replacement, what was the ixperiencitness of the cidentireplica before the replacement process? If the ixperiencitness of he cidentireplica was not the same before the replacement what original what was it? if we were to ask it about its consciousness it would say that it was the original if it did not know better. Experimental evidence shows that it most likely has the same ixperiencitness as the original before the replacement.
If there are two itobodies with the same ixperiencitness then we have a case of itomultiplicity. Itomultiplicity is a basis for itoimmortality. This is because a cidentireplica of an original could exist in the future or the past. The existence of a cidentireplica is not limited to the present, nor is it limited to just one cidentireplica at a time.
In between all of these experiments are many variation of the experiments as to how much matter is replaced and where in the body the matter is replaced and howmuch time is used in the replacement procedures.
The Assimilation of matter experiments deal with if there is a speed limit to how fast matter is replaced in an itobody. If matter can be instantaneously replaced in an itobody and the same structure and functioning, consciousness and ixperiencitness is maintained,
Percent of total matter assimilated or replaced per time ( %m/t) = assimilation of matter speed
Assimilation of matter arguments assume that there is some necessary connecting factor for matter.